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The folIowinB edited ucrrpt, dmwnfom 'The Confrontation 
chiuse &-Rooted and ~aNformed,"ZW3-04 Cato Supreme Court 
Review 439 (2004). by Law School PIofsor Richard D. Friedman, 
divusses the impact, and questions deneraed bg. the US. Supreme 
Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington lastyear that a defemddnt 
mutter how relidble a murt rnoy deem i t  to be, d e s 3  the a c m d  Bas 
had an adequate opportunity to c4&-examinr the aitnrrr who nitzde &he 
statemeht ." 
'Where rn~ntestimonial bearsay is at issue, it  is whofly c~wi.stant 
with the Framers' design to a J d  the statesJlw;i&lity in their dewlip- 
ment ofhearsay law - as docr ~obcr& [Roberts v. Ohio, 4 8  US. 
56 (1 9&0)], and as would an appz~ach that exempted such statements 
from confrontation aauor scrutiny altofldher,'~u&ce Antopa Scalia 
wrote for the Court in gawford .  "Where testimonial evidence is cd issue, 
howeverI the Sixth Amendment demands wha the common law ~hqutired: 
unavailpbility and a prior opportunipfBr cross-examjna3tion. we lonvr 
for another day any effort to spell out a c~mpmhemive d@niition cf 
'tatimonial.'" 
"Crawford is not only Q vindication ofthc righu $the accused, but 
is entitled to confront and cross-examine any testimonial statement 
presented =pi& him. In Crawford. the dcfmdant, chargad with 
attuckin8 another man with a w e ,  contested the trial cow's  admission 
o fa  tape-recorded statemmt his wife made to police without giving him 
the opportunity to cross~examine. The trial court admitted the statement, 
and the appeals court upheld ghe conviction. 
When Crawford was argued before the US. Supreme Court in 
November 200.3, the guiding rinci le or two decades had been that f' P f  
"the U. S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of out-of-court state- 
ments against the accused, without cross-examination, if the xtateamts 
are deemed 'reliable' or 'trustworthy,"'accordin~ to Friedman. But in 
Crawford,"the Supreme Court did a sharp aboutIface, holding that 
a 'testimoni~l'statement cannot be admitted against an accmed, no 
a victoIYf.rjdelity t constitutional text and-intent:~riedmen writes 
5 
in the article from which this excerpt is taken. 4Andyct the decjsim - ' 
leaves many open questions, and ell lawyers involved in the aimi'aal 
ju&ce process will have ro adjust to the new regjme &at it creates.* 
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By Richard D. Friedman 
Crar+rcI reflects a paradigm shift in the doctrine of the 
Confi-ontation Clause. Nonetheless, Crawfird and amici went to 
some pains to  assure the Supreme Court that adoption of the 
testimonial approacl~ woultl alter the results in few, if an): of the 
Court's own precedents. A considerable nunlber of decisioils in 
the lower courts, however, would come out differently under 
Crabrford. To set the groundwork for understanding how Crarford 
alters the doctrinal landscape and the important issues that are 
likely to arise, it will first help to examine several respects in 
which C r a ~ f o r d  does not change the law. 
First, under Crarrford, as before, a statement does not raise 
a confi-ontation issue unless it is offered to prove the truth of 
a matter that it asserts. This is the rule of Tennessee I/. Street [47 1 
U.S. 409, 414 (1985)], which C r a ~ f o r d  explicitly reaffirms. 
In Street itself, for example, the defendant contended that the 
~ o l i c e  coerced him to make a statement similar to  that of an 
accon~plice's confession.The Court ruled unanimously that the 
prosecution therefore could introduce the accomplice's confession 
to demonstrate not that it was true but that it was substantially 
different from the defendant's. That result would be unchanged 
under Crarford.  There may be questions as to  how far a prosecutor 
may take this "not for the truth" argument. For example, if t l ~ e  
prosecutor argues that the statement is being offered as support 
for tile opiilion of an expert witness, in solne cases that might 
be considered too t l in  a veneer. Nonetheless, the basic doctrine 
remains in place. 
Second, many statements that were admissible under Roberts 
will still be adnlissible under Crarford,  thougll the grounds of 
decision will be different. The question is not, as some analysts 
have posed it, 11-hether C r a ~ ~ f o r d  preserves given hearsay excep- 
tions. The rule against hearsay and the Confrontatioi~ Clause are 
separate sources of lam7 - and Crarrford stops the tendenc) to  
meld them. The question for Confrontation Clause purposes in 
each case is whether the given statement is testimonial. The fact 
that a statement fits \vithin a hearsay esception does not alter its 
status ~ v i t h  respect to that question. 
But one can say that most statements that fit xvithin certain 
hearsay exceptions are not testimonial. For esan~ple,  under 
Roberts, business records and conspirator statements were deemed 
reliable because they fell within "firmly rooted" hearsay esemp- 
tions. Under Crairford, almost all such statements vi l l  be consid- 
ered non-testimonial, and therefore the Confrontation Clause \\rill 
i m p o x  little, if any, obstacle to tlleir admissibility. 
Third, the rule of Calfornia  r7. Green [399 U.S. 149 (1970)l 
also is As tile Crarrford Court sumn~arized tlle rule, 
" [Wlhen the declarant appears for cross-esan~ination at trial, the 
ConSrontation Clause places no constraints at all on die use of his 
prior testinloilia1 statements." 
In my vie\v, the rule is a dubious one. It fails to talze into 
account the serious impairment of the ability to cross-examine 
that arises when a witness' prior statement is ad~nitted and the 
witness does not re-assert its substance, effectively \valhng away 
from it. But the Court has sho\~,n 110 inclination to modify the 
States v. Orvens [484 U.S. 554 (1988)], a case involving a witness 
whose severe head injuries destroyed much of his memory - and 
it now becomes more iinportant than ever for prosecutors. If a 
witness makes a statement favorable to  a prosecutor, but the pros- 
ecutor is afraid that the witness will not stand by the statement 
at trial, the prosecutor should not argue that the statement is 
"reliable." Rather, the prosecutor should bring the witness to  
trial, o r  otherwise ensure that the deSendant has had an adequate 
opportunity for cross. If the witness reaffirms the substance of 
the prior statement, all is well and good for the prosecutol-. If she 
testifies at variance from the statement, then the Confrontation 
Clause does not bar admissibility of the statement. 
Fourth, in applying Roberts,  the Court  developed a body 
of case law concerning what constitutes proof of unavailability 
(assuming the given statement can be introduced only if the 
declarant is unavailable), and that case law - including part 
of Roberts itself - is left untouched, for better or worse. At 
argument in Cra~rford, the chief justice asked what impact the 
testimonial approach nlould have on ~k[ancusi I-. Stubbs [40S U.S. 
204 ( 1  972)], a key case in t h s  line and one in which he wrote the 
majority opinion.The proper answer is simple: None at all. 
Fifth, Cramford explicitly preserves the principle that the 
accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation 
right if the accused's oxvn misconduct prevented h m  from ha\-ing 
an adequate opportunih to cross-examine the witness. The right 
may be forfeited, for example, if the accused murdered or inti~lli- 
dated the 17 ltness The forfeltul-e prlnc~ple may take on greater 
Importance under Crai~Jord, as expla~ned belon 
Sixth, the rule of !llarl,land I Cralg [497 U .  S S 36 ( 1990)] 1s 
ul1changed, at least for no]? In that case, the Court held that, 
upon a particularized sho\\ing that a child witness would be 
traumatized by testifying in the presence of the accused, the child 
may testify in another room, ~ v i t l ~  tlle judge and counsel present 
but tlle jury and the accused connected electi-onically. Crar~ford 
addresses the question of when conkontation is required; Craig 
addresses the question of what procedures coilfrontation requires. 
The two cases can coexist peacefully, and nothing in Cra~rford 
suggests that Cralg is placed in doubt. And yet, Justice Scalia 
dissented bitterly in C r a g .  The categorical nature of lus opinion 
in Crorrjird squares better \!-it11 lGs Craig dssent  than x v i t l ~  Justice 
O'Connor's looser majority opinion in Craig, and presunlably he 
would TI-elcorne the opportunity t o  o x r r u l e  Craig. Whether he 
~vould have the votes is an open question. 
Finally, Crar~ford leaves intact the final succor of prosecu- 
tors, the rule that a violation of the confrontation right may be 
l~armless and therefore not require reversal. 
Changes and open questions 
That Craiiford leaves much of the status quo ante  unchanged 
does not gainsay that it changes a great deal, and not just the 
conceptual framework of the Confrontation Clause. Here I TI-ill 
address respects in ~vhich  Cmnford does change the la\\; questions 
that it leaves open, and adjustnle~lts to  existing law that might be 
adopted in its walte. 
rule. Indeed, ~t was reinforced 11)1 Justice Scal~a himself in U n ~ t c d  
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A. The basic change "EX parte in-court testimony or its f~~nct ional  equivalent - that 
Most fuundan~entally, of course, Crar~j'ord ends the prosecute- 
rial use of testi~nonial statements made to police in circumstances 
\\.here the accuscd cannot confl-ont his accuser. That n~eans  that 
\vhen a prosecutor attempts to introduce a testinloilia1 statement 
made by a person \vho is not a ~vitness at trial, the prosecutor 
will not be able to  argue that the statenlent should be admitted 
because it  is reliable. Unless the accused either has had the oppor- 
tunity to  cross-examine the declarant, or has forfeited the right to  
confront her, the statement cannot be admitted. 
Thus, to  take an obvious example, some courts have been 
willing to  admit grand jury testimony given by a witness who is 
not  available at trial, persuading themselves that various factors 
-including the fact that the testimony was given under oath 
- are in the aggregate sufficiently strong "particularized guaran- 
tees of trust\vorttuness" to  excuse the absence of an opportunity 
for cross-examination. Cra~rford means that this practice must 
stop. Similarly, station-house statements, of the type involved in 
Crarfford itself, and statements made in plea hearings may not be 
introduced by the prosecution unless either the witness testifies at 
trial o r  she is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity 
to  cl-oss-examine her. Courts have already begun to apply cases 
consistently \vith these principles. In one Detroit murder case 
pending on  appeal when Crarrford was decided, the prosecutor has 
since confessed error, because the conviction depended in part 
on statements made to a polygraph examiner by a friend of the 
accused. Consider also United States r< Saner [3 1 3  F. Supp. 2d 596 
(S.D. Ind. 2004)], a post-Craarford decision in n ~ l i c h  the accused, 
a bookstore manager, objected to  admission of a statement by a 
competitor, made to a Justice Department lawyer and paralegal, 
that the t\vo managers had fixed prices. The Court held, properly, 
that because the accused had not had a chance to  cross-examine 
the competitor, who asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege 
at trial, Crar~ford precluded admissibility of the competitor's 
statement. 
B. The meaning of "testimonial" 
The most significant question that arises, of course, is how far 
the category of "testimonial" statements extends. 
1. Standards 
The Cra~rford Court did not have difficulty in concluding that 
Sylvia's [the defendant's spouse's] statement was testimonial: 
"Statements taken by police officers in the course of interroga- 
tions," as Syl\:ials \vas, are "testimonial under even a narrow 
standard." As the Court  elaborated: 
"Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
o r  at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the 
rnodern practices ~ v i t h  closest kinship to  the abuses at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed." 
So much for the core. The boundaries o f the  category will 
have t o  be marked out by future cases. The Court quoted three 
standards nrithout choosing among them: 
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unablc to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially"; 
"Estrajuclicial statements . . . contained in forlnalized testimo- 
nial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
or confessions" ; and 
"Staten~ents that were made under circulllstances which 
\vould lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial." 
I believe the t l i rd  of these is the inost useful and accurate. 
It captures the animating idea behind the Confrontation Clause 
-the prevention of a system in which witnesses can offer their 
testimony in private without cross-examination. In some cases, 
under this vie\\: a statement should be considered testinlonial 
even though it was not made to a government official. 
It is by no means certain that this standard n~il l  ultimately 
prevail. Some language in Crarrford emphasizes the role of govern- 
ment officers in creating testimony. For example, having used 
the term "interrogation," the Court takes care to note that 
Sylvia's statement, "knowingly given in response to  structured 
police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition"; at 
another point, i t  noted that "[ilnvolvement of government officers 
in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents 
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse." This emphasis on 
qovernment involvement might suggest that the Court will stick 
closely to  a minimalist definition of testimonial statements. 
That would be a mistake, however. I do not believe that 
participation by government officials in creation of the statement 
- either receipt of it as its initial audience or active procure- 
ment of it through interrogation - is the essence of what makes a 
statement testimonial. 
The confrontation right was recognized in older systems 
in which there was no public prosecutor, and victims or their 
families prosecuted crimes themselves. The idea behind the 
confrontation right is that the judicial system cannot try an 
accused with the aid of testimony by a witness whom the accused 
has not had a chance to confi-ont. The prosecutor plays no essential 
role in the violation. 
Thus, if just before trial a person shoved a written statement 
under the courthouse door, asserting that the accused did in fact 
commit the crime, that ~vould plainly be testimonial even though 
no government official played a role in preparing the statement. 
One ground for hope in this respect is that Crarriford itself noted 
that one of the statements involved in the notorious Raleigll case 
was a letter. 
In some cases a problem that nearly is the remrse arises - an 
investigative official may be seehng to procure evidence, but 
the declarant may not understand this. I believe that in the usual 
case the investigator's anticipation should not alter characteriza- 
tion of the statement. If the declarant does not recognize she is 
creating evidence that may be used in a criminal proceeding, then 
the nature of what she is doing in making the statement is not 
testimonial. 
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Thus, a conversation between criiiiinal confederates, with no 
anticipation of a leak to the authorities, is not ordinarily testinio- 
nial, and if in fact the authorities are surreptitiously recording 
the conversation, that shoultl not change thc result. O n  the other 
hand, investigators probably should not be allowed to disguise 
their intcnt gratuitously - that is, for the purpose of defeating 
tlie confrontation right. Accordingly, even apart from a standard 
lilce the third one quoted above, perhaps a statement should 
be  considered testimonial in mihat might be called an "invited 
statement" context in which the statement fits a description such 
as this: 
Before the statemenr is made, ( I )  a recipient o f t h e  slaternent antici- 
pates erfidentiaiy use $the statement, but does not jnform the declarant o f  
this anticipation, and (2) the prosecution does not demonstrate that disclo- 
su1.e $anticipation $er/identiaiy use ~ i ~ o u l d  have substantialb diminished 
the probability that the declarant would have made the statement. 
The idea behind tlie second prong of sucli a test would be that 
if disclosing the recipient's investigatory activity would not inhibit 
tlie declarant from inaking the statement, then the disclosure 
probably ought to be made; on the other hand, if the disclosure 
would likely prevent the stateinent from being niade, then the 
investigator has sufficient reason for declining to make a disclo- 
sure.This rule seems to me  to have some merit,  but it may be too 
complicated to be applied satisfactorily. 
2. Special cases 
Many cases will arise, in a wide variety of circumstances, 
in which it is a close question whether a statement should be 
deemed testimonial. I will address here two of the most important 
recurring types of cases. 
a. When are 91 1 calls testimonial? 
Consider first the example of statements made in calls to 91 1 
operators. In recent years, courts have often admitted these state- 
ments - most characteristically, by coniplainants in doniestic 
violence cases - even though the caller has not testified in 
court. Under Crarrj'ord, this practice \vould not be allorved if the 
statenient is deemed "testin~onial."The extent to xvhich these calls 
are "testimonial," hove\.er, is an open question. 
The court in one post-C~-ar~j'orrl case [People I: /I4oscar, 777 N.Y.S. 
2d 875 (N.Y. Criin. Ct .  2004)], in justifying its decision tliat state- 
ments in 91 1 calls should not be deeined testimonial, declared: 
"Typically, a wornan \vho calls 9 1 1 for help because she has 
just been stabbed or shot is not contenlplatiiig being a '\vitness' in 
future legal she is usually trying simply to save her 
o ~ v n  life." 
This generalization fits some cases, but not all. In some cases, 
tlie caller docs not perceive tliat she is any longcr in immediate 
danger, and the primar)r purpose of the call is simply to initiate 
investigative and prosecutorial machinery. Indeed, often the call 
occurs a considerable time after the particular episode has closed, 
and often tlie caller gives a good deal of illformation that is not 
necessary Lor immediate intervention. In a broader set of cases, 
the caller's motives are mixed but she is Lully aware tliat ~ v l ~ a t  she
says has potential evidentiary value. 
Consider, for example, State v. Davis [64 P. 3d 661 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2003)], now on review in the Washington Supreme Court  
(the same court from w h c h  Crabford came). The complainant 
called 91 1 and, in response to  questions by the operator, disclosed 
that tlie defendant had beaten her ~,vith lus fists and then run out 
the door, further disclosed that she had a protection order against 
him, and explained the reasons why he had been in her house. The 
complainant did not testify at trial, and the 91 1 tape was played to 
the jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor said, "[A]lthough she 
is not here today to talk to  you[,] she left something better. She 
left you her testimony on the day tliat this happened . . . . [Tlhis 
sho~os that the defendant, Adrian Davis, was at her home and 
assaulted her." 
Then the prosecutor played the 91 1 tape again. Here, the 
statement has strong claim to be considered testimonial. Davis 
and cases like it suggest that the 9 1 1 -call scenario should not 
be dismissed by broad generalizations about the "typical" case. 
Rather, a case-by-case assessment is necessary. Indeed, even if a 
91 1 call is nothing but an urgent plea for protection, the court 
should closely scrutiilize it. I \\;ill repeat here the analysis that 
Bridget McCorinack [Law School Associate Dean for Clinical 
Affairs] and I haw given: 
"To the extent the call itself is part of the incident being tried, 
the fact of the call presumably should be admitted so the prosecu- 
tion can present a coherent story about the incident. But even 
in that situation, t l ~ e  need to present a coherent story does not 
necessarily justify admitting the contents of the call. And even if 
the circumstances do warrant allowing the prosecution to prove 
the contents of the call, those contents generally should not be 
admitted to  prove the truth of \{-hat they assert . . . .To the extent 
that the contents of the call are significant only as the caller's 
report of \\,hat has happened, such a report usually should be 
considered testimonial." 
b. When are statements by children "testimonial"? 
Another ~ p e  of case &at frequently will test the limits of the 
tern1 "testimonial" involves statements by children, typically 
alleging some kind of abuse. Suppose, for example, a young child 
tells a police officer that an adult has physically o r  sexually abused 
her. If an adult made sucli a statement, it I\-ould clearly be testi- 
monial. But can a different result occur in tlle case of a 1-er? young 
child? 
At some point, the statement of a very young child may 
perhaps be considered more like the bark of a bloodhound than 
like the testimony of an adult human; that is, tlie child may be 
reacting to and colninunicating about what occ~u-I-ed, Ivith no 
sense of the consequences that her communication may ha\-e. 
Arguably, fidelity to the text and policies of the Confrontation 
Clause suggests that some degree of understanding of the conse- 
quences of the statement is necessary before a declarailt may 
be considered a "xvitness." If that is true, the better rule \vould 
probably be that a person is not a \.\;itness uldcss she understands 
tliat tlie statement, if accepted, is likely to  lead to adverse conse- 
quei~cesfor the person accused. Under this vie\\;, a child could 
be a ~ i t n e s s  even if she had no real understandillg of the legal 
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svstem; it \vould be enough to k n o ~ \ -  that telling a police officer 
about a bad thing that a person did would likely cause that person 
t o  be punished. 
I11 deciding whether a child is capable of acting as a "w.itness," 
the ~ n o r a l  as \\.ell as cognitive development of the child may well 
be material. My colleague [U-h4 La\$- School Professor] Sllerinan 
Clark has argued that part of what drives the confrontation right 
is not siinply the formal categorization of a person as a "witness," 
but also the moral sense of the obligation of an accuser to  confront 
the accused. If he is right - and I believe there is a good deal of 
force to  the argument - then the inlportant question is not only 
~vhe ther  the child understands the punitive consequences of the 
statement, but also "the level of obligation and responsibility we 
are 11-illing to  put on the shoulders of children." 
Even assuming a given child is capable of making a testimo- 
nial statement, the fact that the declarant is a child can compli- 
cate the question of > ~ ~ h e t l ~ e r  th  particular stateinent should be 
deemed testimonial. As I suggested earlier, when an adult makes 
a statement accusing a person of a crime, the statement should 
be considered testimonial, even though the statement is made to 
a private individual, if the declarant understands that the listener 
will pass the information on to the authorities. But consider 
children's statements t o  interi~lediaries - for instance, a child's 
statement to  h s  mother. This situation may be materially l f fe ren t  
from that of the adult witness, because even a child sufficiently 
mature to  be  capable of being considered a witness may have no 
understanding that the third party will pass the statement on to 
the authorities. 
There are different ways t o  approach this problem. One  view 
is that the statement is not testimonial if a chdd in the position of 
the declarant would not understand that the information I+-ould 
reach the authorities. A second ~ i e w  is that if the child, ni thout  
understanding the particulars, expects the mother to  visit adverse 
consequences upon the assailant, then the child should be deemed 
t o  be testifying xzithin his or her ability to  do so. And a third view 
is that differentiating by maturity is simply inappropriate and 
uladministrable, so the perspective of a reasonable adult should 
goyern determination of whether a statement is deemed testimo- 
nial. 
Furthermore, the supplemental standard I have suggested as 
a possibility in "invited statement" contexts may be appropriate 
in certain cases involving statements by children. Under that 
standard, the stateinent should be deemed testimonial (1)  if the 
investigative nature of the con~~ersation is withheld from the c h l d  
but (2)  it does not appear that the nondisclosure was necessary 
to  procure the statement. Again, the idea is that the investigator 
should not be allo~ved to withhold the purposes of her inquiries 
qratuitously in an effort to defeat the confrontation right -but 
L 
the complexity of this inquiry gives m e  some qualms whether this 
standard should be applied. 
Plainly, this is an extraordinarily complex and dimcult area, 
and pending further guidance from the Court it will remain vel-y 
uncertain. 
3. What constitutes an "opportunity for cross-examination"? 
Under Crorrford, the confi-ontation right presumptively is 
violated if a statenlent is considered "testimonial" but the \vitness 
does not testify at trial. By contrast, the confi-ontation right is not 
violated where the witness is unavailable and the accused has had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination. I11 the wal<e of Cro~rford, 
a \vise prosecutor, aware of the possibility that a key witness may 
be unavailable, will often take the witness's deposition early in 
the investigation. Crorrford therefore raises an important question 
about what constitutes an adequate "prior opportunity for cross- 
examination." 
For example, suppose a laboratory report is a critical piece of 
evidence. In most circumstances, the lab report should be consid- 
ered testimonial, because the report is prepared in anticipation of 
its introduction at trial. Therefore, the lab teclmician who made 
the report should testify at trial if she is available to do so. If she 
becomes unavailable through no fault of the accused (by accidental 
death, for example), and the accused has not had an opportunity 
to  cross-esamine her, then the report should not be considered 
admissible. 
But Lf the prosecution takes her deposition - that is, a pretrial 
examination, subject to  oath and cross-esamination - and the 
technician later becomes unavailable, the prosecutor may use the 
deposition if the deposition presented an adequate opportunity 
for cross-examination. 
Because Cratford increases the prosecutor's incentive to take a 
deposition, Tve can expect pressure to amend the rules of criminal 
procedure in jurisdictions, including at the federal level, in which 
depositions are not now readily available, and perhaps even to 
allow depositions before charges have been brought. If a deposi- 
tion is taken very early, obviously there will often be a question 
whether it gave the accused an adequate opportunity to cross- 
examine. Did counsel have enough time to prepare? Did counsel 
know what issues to  press, and have the information at hand that 
would enable her to do so effectively?The better approach ~vould 
not be to  assunle that early opportu~lities are inadequate per se; 
in many cases, counsel will have little difficulty, even with limited 
preparation and eve11 before matters h a x  proceeded very far, 
determining what questions to ask. Rather, if the defendant had 
an opportunity to  cross-examine the witness at deposition but the 
witness is unavailable at trial, the confrontation right should not 
require exclusion unless the defense shows some particular reason 
to believe the opportunity was inadequate. 
One more change in prosecutorial practice lnay well follow 
from Cranford. Suppose a prosecutor announces an intention 
to use a witness' statement and invites the defense to  demand 
a deposition of the witness if it wants to be assured of cross- 
examining the witness. If the defendant does not make the 
demand, the witness is unavailable at trial, and the prosecution 
offers the statement, would this procedure suffice to  protect 
adequately the "opportunity for confi-ontation"? Perhaps, by not 
making the demand though bcing warned of the possible conse- 
quences, the defendant would be deemed to have waived thc 
co~lfrontation I-ight. O r  perhaps the ~irould be consid- 
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ered a violation of the accused's passive right to  do nothing and 
"be confronted with" the witnesses against him. We may never 
kllo~v for sure unless the procedure is tried. 
4. What constitutes "forfeiture"? 
The idea that the accused cannot claim the confrontation right 
if the accused's own misconduct prevents the witness from testi- 
fying at trial is a very old one. Cracrfoord explicitly reaffirms it, and 
justifiably so. 
Forfeiture often raises difficult issues. If a witness is murdered 
shortly before she was scheduled to testify against the accused, 
what sho\ving of the accused's involvement does the prosecu- 
tion have to make? Is it enough that the accused acquiesced in 
the wrongdoing? And h o ~ v  is participation or acquiescence to  be 
determined; 1s the mere fact that the accused benefited froin the 
murder enough to raise a presumption that the accused acquiesced 
in it? 
One issue on \vhicl~ Crarrford gives little o r  no guidance may 
be expected to become particularly pressing now. Suppose the 
wrongful act that allegedly rendered the witness unavailable is the 
same act \vitI~ ~vhich he is charged. May the act nevertheless cause 
a forfeiture of the confrontation right? For example, suppose the 
accusation is of child sexual abuse and the prosecution argues 
that the abuse itself has intimidated the child from testifying in 
court (though she previously made a statement describing it). O r  
suppose the accusation is of murder, the prosecution contending 
that the accused struck a fatal b lo~v  and that the victim made a 
statement identifying the accused and then died? 
The first reaction of many observers is that in such situations 
forfeiture would be bizarre. And yet, for reasons I will sunlmarize 
briefly, I believe that in some circumstances it is appropriate. 
In post-Cracrford cases, txvo state supreme courts [Colorado and 
Kansas] have agreed. 
The objection most frequently made to applying forfeiture 
doctrine in situations of this sort is that it is bootstrapping: The 
accused is held to have forfeited the confrontation right on the 
ground that he or she committed the very act on rvlIich the trial 
centers - an act that he or she is accused of committing, but 
denies collnnitting and is presuined not to have committed. O n  
closer analysis, I do not believe tlle objection carries weight. 
Tlle situation is analogous to the one that often arises \!.hen a 
defendant is accused of conspiracy and the prosecution argues that 
the hearsay rule poses no bar to ad~nission of a statement made by 
a conspirator in support of the conspiracy. In each of these cases, 
the same factual issue - tlle defendant's participation in the 
conspiracy in the one case, and his co~ninission of the n-rongful 
act that rendered the witness ~u~available in the other - may 
arise as a tl~reshold matter for evidentiary purposes and when 
determining guilt, but so ~~rllat?Tlle issue will likely be decided for 
the two different purposes by difrerent fact-finders - the judge 
deciding tl~l-eshold evidentiary matters and the jury deterinining 
guilt - and on different factual bases. 
Another objection is that presumably the crinle \\.as not 
committed for the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable. 
But again I respond \vith a shrug. The point of forfeiture doctrine 
is that the accused has acted wrongfully in a way that is incom- 
patible with maintenance of the right. Suppose that a11 informer 
makes a statement to  the police describing a drug kingpin's illegal 
activities. But the informer stays undercover and, before the 
kingpin knows anything about the statement, the two get into a 
fight over a card game. The kingpin goes to  a closet, pulls out a 
gun, and inurders the informer. If the lungpin is tried on drug 
charges and the prosecution wants to introduce the informer's 
statement, the kingpin should not succeed in arguing, "But I 
haven't had a chance to  cross-examine him." The appropriate 
response is, "And whose fault is that?You murdered him." 
As interpreted in this way, forfeiture doctrine can solve one 
of the puzzles of the confrontation right.The Craufoord Court 
accurately noted that the "dylng declaration" exception is the only 
exception commonly applicable to  testimonial statements that 
had been well established at the time of the Sixth Amendment's 
adoption in 179 1 . The Court then said, with apparently studied 
ambiguity, "If this exception must be accepted on historical 
grounds, it is sui p e r i s . "  It seems highly unlikely that the Court  
~vould generally exclude statements that fit within the dying 
declaration exception, thus achieving a remarkably unappealing 
evidentiary result that courts have avoided for several h ~ n d r e d  
years. 
O n  the other hand, admitting these statements on the ground 
suggested by the Court raises problems of its o\vn. It obscures t l ~ e  
clarity of the principle adopted by Crarford, that if a statement is 
testimonial it cannot be introduced against the accused unless lie 
had an opportunity to cross-esamine the ~vitness. And it does so 
on very \veak grounds, for (as noted above) the rationale general1)- 
cited for the dying declaration exception is absurd. A far better 
resolution would be to  r e c o p z e  that, however the admissi- 
bility of dying declarations usually has been defended, it  really is 
best understood as a reflection of d ~ e  principle that a defendant 
~ ~ h o  renders a ~ ~ i t n e s s  unavailable by \\.rongful means cannot 
complain about her absence at trial. That principle also explains, 
incidentally, \vhy ( 1 )  the hearsay exceptiorl for dying declarations 
is limited to those that describe the cause of deatll, and (2) the 
declaration  ill not be admitted unless death appeared irrlininent 
at tlle time the declaration was made. 
C. Crawfords impact on non-testimonial statements 
If a statenlent is deemed not to  be testinlonial, \vhat is t l ~ e  
impact of the Conkontation Clause? Cra~ford does not resolve the 
matter. The tlleory of the opinion suggests, and the Court  explic- 
itly preserves the possibility of, "an approach that exempted such 
statenlents fi-on1 Confrontatioil Clause scrutiny altogether." But, 
in an apparent compromise, the Court also indicated tllat Roberts, 
or some standard even more flexible, might also be applied in 
this context. Nuinerous post-Crar~jird courts, haying determined 
the statements at issue were not testimonial, haye gone t l ~ r o u g l ~  
the Roberts analysis and - not surprisiugly - determilled that 
thc statelnents were admissible. It is easy enough to see \\-l1y a 
court disposed to admit a statement ~ ~ o u l d  follo-\\. this approach: 
If instcad the court held that the Confi-ontation Clause did not 
LQN Winter 2005 1 85 
applv at all to non-testimonial ctatemcnts, it might leave itsclf 
vulnerable to rcversal if a hisher court held that Rohcrtv continues 
to apply to such a statcment. So it is prudent to run through thc 
Roherts analysis, M-hich a court can a11va1.s find is satisfied if it \\.ants 
to (that being one of the problems 11-ith Rohcrrs.) No terrible harm 
is done, perhaps, but the process is n~asteful, bccause courts \\.ill 
continue to run through it 11-ith predictable results. Until a pros- 
ecutor is brave enough to press the point, it is doubtful that thcre 
\[-ill be a clear test in the Supreme Court on the proposition that 
outside thc contest of testimonial statements, the Confrontation 
Clause has no force. 
Conclusion 
Plainly, Cran.ford leaves open many very important questions. 
In particular, the impact of the opinion may be very different 
depending on whether the Supreme Court adopts a broad or 
narrow undci-standing of the term "testimonial ." But li-hat is most 
important is that the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause, 
aftcr a long detour, has been set on the proper course. This means 
that the discourse can be rational and candid. Rather than manipu- 
lating unans\serablc questions as to whether a given statement 
is sufficiently "reliable" to warrant admission, the courts will be 
asking \i-hether admission violates the time-honored and constitu- 
tionally protected right of a criminal defendant to insist witnesses 
against him testify subject to cross-examination. 
Even in the pages of this journal, I am willing to confess that I 
am not a strict originalist in constitutional interpretation. I believe 
that there are some questions of constitutional law that cannot 
be anslsered most usefull!. by asking lshat the public meaning 
\\-as of the constitutional test at the time it \vas adopted, or what 
the intention of the Framers was. But in this contest, all indica- 
tions are in alignment. The historical background shoxss that the 
meaning of the text and the intention of the Framers are quite 
clcar, and the unequivocal procedural rule on which they insisted 
continues to resonate today as one of the ccntral aspects of our 
svstem of criminal procedure. The Crartford Court properly 
said, "By replacing catcgorical constitutional guarantees with 
open-endcd balancing tcsts, \r-e do violence to their design." The 
Constitution does not always speak in terms of categorical guaran- 
tees, but \vhcn it does, as in the case of the Confrontation Clause, 
it should be heeded. Give credit to the Court for disenthralling 
itsclf from a doctrine that had grown familiar but had no basis in 
thc Constitution and was utterl!. unsatisfactory, and for recog- 
nizing the essence of thc confrontation right. 
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